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Abstract: 
This paper investigates the speed of institutional development induced by European 
integration. The hypotheses are the following. The prospect for European countries to join 
the EU disposes them to strengthen their institutions, so that the speed of institutional 
development is high. Furthermore, EU Member States preparing for the introduction of the 
euro have incentives to develop their institutions, but the speed of institutional development 
is much lower. As soon as Member States introduce the euro, institutional development 
grinds to a halt, or is even reversed, as there could be incentives to undo reforms. To test 
these hypotheses, we estimate a dynamic panel data model, in which the institutional 
development is measured as positive changes in Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). 
The WGIs are explained by the “status” of the European countries (i.e. being a member of 
the euro area, a Member State of the EU preparing to adopt the euro, an acceding country, a 
candidate country, a potential candidate country or none of the above) and additional 
controls. To sum up the findings, we can confirm a positive effect of prospective EU 
membership. Being a Member State does not influence the institutional development path. 
However, for members of the euro area, there is robust evidence for institutional deterioration 
in one particular area, namely control of corruption. 
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1 Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized that the institutional development and transformation process in the 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe paved the way for the considerable and 
ongoing enlargement of the European Union (EU). Furthermore, the prospect for European 
countries to join the EU creates additional incentives for them to strengthen their institutions, 
and the EU serves as an “outside anchor” for the reform process (Berglöf, Roland 1997, 
p. 2). On the one hand, conditionality on the EU accession (Copenhagen criteria) is an 
obstacle candidate countries have to overcome. On the other hand, it provides the transition 
countries’ governments with guidelines for reforms. The adoption of the euro does not have 
direct legal effects on institutional development, but it can have economic implications on it. 
Liikanen (2005, p. 60) argues that the Maastricht criteria will foster future institutional 
reforms, not just those explicitly required in the Maastricht criteria. 
 
One aim of this paper is to assess empirically whether the prospect for European countries to 
join the EU disposes them to strengthen their institutions. Certainly, one would expect a 
positive impact of this prospect. The more challenging question concerns what happens to 
the institutional development after the country has become a Member State of the EU 
preparing for the introduction of the euro and finally a member of the euro area. 
 
Some empirical literature exists on the link between prospective EU membership and 
institutional development in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In a 
cross-section, Beck and Laeven (2006) identify a positive link between the EU accession and 
the Worldwide Governance Indicators, although they do not control for reverse causality. Di 
Tommaso et al. (2007) examine the determinants of institutional change using a panel data 
set comprising 25 transition economies. Their approach is to treat institutional change as a 
multidimensional unobserved variable. The results suggest that an external anchor, such as 
EU accession, can break the path dependence of institutional change to some extent. Using 
a Hausman–Taylor model for a panel data set of 25 transition countries, Schweickert et al. 
(2011) identify a positive link between the pre-accession incentives provided by the EU and 
NATO and institutional development. Building on a theoretical model that explains how the 
prospective EU membership drives regulation in applicant countries beyond their equilibrium 
level of regulatory quality, Mattli and Plümper (2004) estimate that the EU application 
accounts for approx. 40% of the variance of regulatory quality in transition countries. 
Regulatory quality is measured by the average of the nine European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD) transition indicators. Moreover, Mattli and Plümper (2004) provide 
evidence that exogenous changes in the perceived likelihood of EU accession have an 
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impact on the pace of reforms. Countries with the prospect of late accession reform 
significantly less than their early accession counterparts. Brücker et al. (2005) test whether 
accession  candidate countries have a lower long-term labour to output ratio and adjust 
labour productivity faster to its long-run levels than other transition countries. This is an 
indication for the hardening of soft budget constraints (SBC), which the EU accession can 
foster according to their model. Indeed, they find that in accession candidate countries the 
speed of adjustment is significantly larger and labour productivity is significantly higher. The 
only paper that finds no significant effect of prospective EU membership on development of 
economic institutions is that of Staehr (2011). He estimates the impact of EU enlargement on 
political and economic reforms in former socialist countries from 1989 to 2008. A set of 
dummy variable captures the progress of each transition country in the EU enlargement 
process; political reforms comprise political rights and civil liberties, and the EBRD transition 
indicators capture economic reforms. While prospective and actual membership have 
positive effects on political reforms, the effect on economic reforms is insignificant or even 
negative. However, as political freedom explains much of the progress in economic reforms, 
and political reforms are in turn influenced by the actual and prospective EU membership, 
economic reforms are indirectly determined by the EU enlargement process, rather than 
directly. 
 
Two strands of literature analyse the impact of the euro area membership. The first focuses 
on reforms in the regulation of product and labour markets. The second examines the 
influence on fiscal deficits. For example, Alesina et al. (2010) show that the euro accelerated 
reforms in the product markets and seems to have been accompanied by wage moderation 
in the labour market. Duval and Elmeskov (2005), Belke et al. (2007) and Belke and Vogel 
(2012) also contribute to this strand of literature. Investigating the modes of organization of 
the budget process in ten Central and Eastern European countries, Gleich (2003) detects a 
relationship between institutional settings and fiscal performance. He shows that procedures 
that contribute to reducing collective action problems have been associated with more fiscal 
discipline. Hence, progress in the institutional structure of the budgeting process can 
facilitate the compliance with the Maastricht criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact. Bayar 
and Smeets (2009) and Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2007) also found a positive effect 
of the Maastricht Treaty on fiscal balance. In contrast, Galli and Padovano (2008) and Mink 
and Haan (2005) do not find support for this thesis.  Eijffinger and Stadhouders (2003) 
examine the relationship between inflation, the institutional design of monetary institutions 
and the rule of law. They argue that legal arrangements are a necessary condition for central 
bank independence, but the actual application of law is much more important to achieve 
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price stability. Institutional quality indicators are used as a proxy for the rule of law, and they 
are shown to be significantly and negatively related to the inflation rate.  
 
However, to our knowledge, there is empirical literature on neither the link between EU 
membership with preparation to introduce the euro and institutional development nor the 
relationship between current euro area membership and institutional development. The only 
evidence is provided by a case study by Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013), which shows 
that economic reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated after the introduction of 
the euro in Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The aim of our paper is to shed light on 
these relationships.  
 
In this paper, the term “institutions” is defined broadly and we do not explore specific policy 
measures or institutional arrangements. To measure institutional development, we employ 
the six Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) of Kaufmann et al. (2010): Voice and 
Accountability (VaA), Control of Corruption (CoC), Government Effectiveness (GE), Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence (PSNV), Rule of Law (RoL) and Regulatory Quality (RQ). 
Institutional development is measured as positive changes in the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGIs). This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the 
theoretical considerations why we care about institutional development, and how the 
European integration matters for institutional development.  Section 3 describes our empirical 
model and the estimation method. The data on institutional development and the countries’ 
status is explained in Section 4. Section 5 presents and discusses our result and Section 6 
provides various robustness checks. To sum up our findings, we can confirm a positive effect 
of prospective EU membership for most WGIs and econometric specifications. In particular, 
prospective EU membership reduces the persistence of institutional development. Being a 
Member State does not influence the institutional development path. However, there is 
robust evidence for the deterioration of control of corruption for members of the euro area. 
The last section contains the conclusion.  
 
 
2 Theoretical framework 
 
Three central questions shape our theoretical framework. First, does institutional 
development matter? Second, does the EU influence institutional development, and which 
role does the EU conditionality play in the accession process? Third, does the membership in 
the euro area matter for institutional development? 
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In the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union committed to “promote economic and social 
progress which is balanced and sustainable” (European Union 29/07/1992, Common 
Provisions, Article B). Among others, catching up in the institutional development of Member 
States could contribute to long-term income convergence in the EU and the euro area. 
Roland (2000, p. XIX) emphasizes the importance of adequate institutions for economic 
growth in transition countries: the experience of transition from socialism to capitalism in 
former socialist economies shows that the structural policies of liberalization, stabilization 
and privatization should be accompanied by adequate institutions to deliver successful 
outcomes. According to the development and growth literature, there is a positive link 
between the institutional development of a country and its development stage and income 
growth, respectively. Since the contributions by North (1981, 1990), many attempts have 
been made to verify this hypothesis empirically (see for example Beck and Laeven (2006) 
and references therein). Here, we discuss two empirical papers, which particularly shape our 
selection of control variables. Dollar and Kraay (2003) investigate the partial effects of 
institutions and trade on GDP growth in a panel of around 100 countries and decadal growth 
rates in the 1990s, 1980s and 1970s. Using a two-stage least-squares estimation (2SLS) in 
first differences and lagged explanatory variables as instruments, they find a substantial 
partial effect of changes in trade on changes in GDP growth. Moreover, changes in the 
measures of institutions have a positive but smaller effect. Rigobon and Rodrik (2005) 
estimate the interrelationships between rule of law, democracy, openness and income. In a 
cross section, they use differences in the variances of error terms across sub-samples of the 
data to identify the coefficients of the four endogenous variables. This strategy is called 
identification through heteroscedasticity (IH) and is an alternative to the instrumental variable 
approach. They find that democracy and law of rule influence income positively and that the 
rule of law has a stronger impact on income than democracy. However, the reverse is also 
likely to be true. They find some indication that higher income produces better institutions 
(i.e. rule of law and democracy). Regarding openness, their results are striking, as they find 
an asymmetric effect of openness on economic and political institutions. Openness improves 
the indicator rule of law, but worsens democracy, although the former effect is not significant 
in every specification. Even if institutional development is socially desirable in a country, 
reforms may be not implemented because of problems covered by the public choice theory. 
These could be, for example, strategic decisions of self-interested politicians and national or 
international distributional conflicts (see for example Drazen 2000). 
 
The second question is related to the literature on the EU as an external or outside anchor 
and EU conditionality. Crombrugghe et al. (1996) outline the motivation for fast integration of 
transition countries into the EU based on self-fulfilling expectations. The transition country’s 
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expectation of EU entry can coordinate the expectations towards a fast-growth, catching-up 
equilibrium. The premise is that both the transition countries and the EU transparently and 
strongly commit to reforms and enlargement, respectively. This would accelerate 
investments and growth in the transition countries and attract foreign direct investment. This 
can be shown in a model of self-fulfilling rational expectations based on Krugman (1991), 
which Crombrugghe et al. (1996, pp. 2, 16-17) apply to EU enlargement. Reforms that 
strengthen the flexibility of an economy or an exogenous boom, for example, in foreign direct 
investment can boost the economy. However, to achieve enduring high economic growth 
rates, the co-ordination of the positive expectations of investors is important if there are 
external economies (i.e. positive externalities). If the reforms are expected to be credible, 
growth-promoting actions of investors (i.e. investment, sectoral reallocation, political support 
for reforms) are more likely. The credibility of a reform is taken for granted when investors 
expect the reform to be permanent and if each investor believes that other investors will also 
expect it to be permanent. Hence, whether the promised growth effects of reforms occur also 
depends on the public’s expectations about the future (Crombrugghe et al. 1996, p. 2). A 
strong commitment to enlargement and transparent conditionality can coordinate these 
expectations towards a catching-up equilibrium.  
 
Roland and Verdier (2003) develop a model to analyse law enforcement problems in 
transition economies with coordination problems and multiple equilibria. They show that 
accession to the EU provides a mechanism to overcome a “bad” equilibrium if the 
“accessing” country is small enough relative to the EU. Mattli and Plümper (2004) provide a 
formal model that explains how prospective EU membership drives regulation in applicant 
countries beyond their equilibrium level of regulatory quality. The paper by Brücker et al. 
(2005) models the soft budget constraint (SBC) problem in transition economies as a war of 
attrition between the applicant countries’ governments and firms. They show that outside 
conditionality can foster SBC hardening. 
 
The role of EU conditionality in the accession process can be discussed separately from a 
normative and a positive point of view, i.e. how the EU conditionality should be shaped and 
how it was in fact applied. The principle of conditionality requires that clear and equal 
accession conditions apply to all countries, their progress is evaluated coherently and without 
discrimination by the EU and their status of accession is directly dependent upon these 
evaluations (Kochenov 2008, p. 299). European Union conditionality, if designed and 
conducted properly, has several positive effects (Crombrugghe et al. 1996, p. 9). First, it 
provides the transition countries’ governments with guidelines for reforms. Second, it 
introduces competition between political parties in a transition country for the best reforms to 
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meet the conditions if the public regards the EU membership as desirable. Third, it enables 
the transition countries to make a sovereign decision on whether it is worth entering the EU 
based on a cost–benefit analysis.  
 
Weber (1995) examines the political conditionality on trade and aid by the European Union, 
which he calls “European Union conditionality”, from the late 1980s to 1994. Following the 
collapse of the Eastern bloc, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states expressed the 
desire to reintegrate themselves into Western Europe. The European Community (EC) 
launched several aid and trade programmes with explicit or implicit political conditionality 
regarding the rule of law, democracy and economic liberalization (Weber 1995, pp. 198–
203). The first programme was the Poland, Hungary Aid for Reconstruction (PHARE), 
followed by association agreements, also called Europe agreements, with the CEE countries 
that joined the EU in 2004/2007 and later the stabilization and association agreements with 
the Western Balkan countries. Weber shows that the conditionality was not a paper tiger in 
the early 1990s. In several countries, the programmes were suspended or delayed in 
response to non-compliance (Weber 1995, pp. 198–203). 
 
For the conditionality principle to work, the EU moved away from a deeply politicized practice 
of enlargement regulation to an increasingly legal enlargement regulation in the 1990s 
(Kochenov 2008, p. 297). The Copenhagen European Council formulated accession criteria 
in 1993: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect 
for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as 
well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic 
and monetary union. (European Council 22/06/1993, 7.A.iii)) 
 
These criteria are called the “Copenhagen criteria” and they were implemented by the 
Copenhagen-related documents in the course of the recent enlargements. In a jurisprudential 
analysis of the EU conditionality on the new CEE Member States, Kochenov (2008) shows 
that the EU successfully formed a framework of instruments for the application of the 
conditionality principle regarding the criteria “democracy” and “rule of law”. However, he 
concludes that the application of the instruments was a “resounding failure, if it was applied 
at all” (Kochenov 2008, p. 300), at least in the areas of democracy and rule of law. A 
country’s status towards accession was not linked to the Commission’s evaluation, so that 
the conditionality principle was de facto removed in the areas of democracy and rule of law 
(Kochenov 2008, pp. 300–301).  
 
7 
 
The third question concerns the influence of euro area membership on institutional 
development. Alesina et al. (2010) lay down some economic arguments why the membership 
in the euro area could accelerate and facilitate deregulation in product markets and 
liberalization and deregulation in labour markets. They describe two channels by which the 
euro could foster reforms: the competition channel and the adjustment channel. The former 
establishes a relationship between more competition due to the single market and the cost of 
regulation. If one agrees upon that a common currency is a necessary condition for having a 
truly common market, than the protection of insider firms and workers by anti-competitive 
regulation would become more costly and visible to consumers and voters. The second 
channel becomes relevant, whenever a country is losing competitiveness. The common 
currency eliminates the possibility of strategic devaluations, when the real wage growth is out 
of line with productivity growth. Hence, adjustment has to come by real wage adjustment and 
labour mobility and flexibility (Alesina et al. 2010, p. 2). This argument is related to the TINA 
(There Is No Alternative) argument. By introducing the euro, the member countries become 
unable to use monetary policy to accommodate asymmetric shocks. Instead, adjustment has 
to come via a boom or recession. This will be less painful in terms of unemployment, the 
more flexible the labour market is. Therefore, euro area members have to develop market-
based adjustment channels to adjust to shocks (Bean 1998, p. 368; Alesina et al. 2010, p. 6). 
On the other side, some economists argue that the euro could hamper the labour market 
reforms. Reforms on the supply side entail negative short-term effects on employment. 
These can be alleviated by expansionary aggregate demand policies. In the euro area, 
member countries are constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact in pursuing fiscal policy, 
and they are unable to conduct monetary policy. Hence, the short-term costs of labour 
market reforms are higher in a common currency area and reforms may become politically 
unfeasible (Bean 1998, p. 377; Alesina et al. 2010, p. 7). Saint-Paul and Bentolila (2001) 
argue that this applies for big changes in labour market institutions, rather than small 
reforms. They show that large-scale labour market reforms will be harder to implement, 
whereas some gradual reforms towards flexibility are easier to implement within the euro 
area. 
 
Berglöf et al. (2008; 2012) present a model where a member of a club, say of the EU, has 
incentives to reform beyond his privately optimal level. This model can also show under 
which conditions a club-in-club, for example the euro area, emerges and why even weak 
members of the outer club (EU) reform to meet the accession criteria of the inner club (euro 
area). The more heterogeneous the members of the organization are the more likely is the 
formation of an inner club. The imminent negative externality on the members of the outer 
organization is the driver for more effort. In this spirit, the creation of a common currency 
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area with strict criteria for joining (Maastricht criteria) is a “club-in-club” that remains open to 
every country willing to reform, and therefore joining the euro area (Berglöf et al. 2012, pp. 
501–502). 
 
In a case study, Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2013) show that economic reforms were 
abandoned and institutions deteriorated after the introduction of the euro in Spain, Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal. They argue that as the euro facilitated large inflows of capital, which 
enabled the emergence of the financial bubble in peripheral countries, economic reforms 
were abandoned, institutions deteriorated and the response to the credit bubble was 
delayed. This hampered the growth prospects of these countries. Fernández-Villaverde et al. 
(2013) analyse two channels to explain this development, which contrasted strongly with the 
German case. First, capital flows relaxed the economic constraints under which agents (e.g. 
a government, bank manager) were acting, which reduced the pressure for reforms. Second, 
capital inflows hindered the principal (e.g. voters, shareholders, investors) in extracting 
signals about the performance of the agent. Germany did not experience a loosening of its 
financing conditions because of the introduction of the euro, and it was faced with a stagnant 
economy. Hence, Germany implemented far-reaching structural reforms, so that the 
divergence in institutions between Germany and the other peripheral countries increased 
after the introduction of the euro (Fernández-Villaverde et al. 2013, pp. 146–147).  
 
To sum up the literature, there could be indirect effects of the Maastricht criteria on 
institutional reforms. As soon as Member States introduce the euro, there are virtually no 
effective enforcement measures, so the incentives to undertake institutional reforms may 
disappear. However, the conclusions of the theoretical models on this question are 
ambiguous. 
 
 
3 Econometric model and estimation method 
 
In our empirical analysis, we are interested in revealing the speed of institutional 
development induced by European integration. The hypotheses are the following. The 
prospect for European countries to join the EU disposes them to strengthen their institutions, 
so that the speed of institutional development is high. Furthermore, EU Member States 
preparing for the introduction of the euro have incentives to develop their institutions, but the 
speed of institutional development is much lower. As soon as Member States introduce the 
euro, institutional development grinds to a halt, or is even reversed, as there could be 
incentives to undo reforms. Of course, it is difficult to measure incentives directly. In fact, we 
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can only capture actual outcomes, i.e. the values of the indicators for institutional 
development.  
 
It must be pointed out that the status of a country may affect its institutional development with 
a time lag rather than instantaneously since it usually takes some time to implement 
institutional reforms. Beyond that, one can suppose a level effect of the institutional 
development. Leaving the other variables constant, a country that is highly institutionally 
developed will probably face more difficulties in developing its institutions further at the same 
pace as a less institutionally developed country. Moreover, the marginal effect of the status 
on the change in the WGIs may depend on the level of the WGIs. Therefore, we introduce 
interaction terms between the status variables and the lagged-level WGIs.1 This also allows 
for different slopes for the level effect of the WGIs depending on the status.2 From the 
institutional development and growth theory one can assume the following relationships 
between institutional development and time varying control variables. Institutional 
development depends positively on the GDP per capita and the level of openness of a 
country.3 Also the control variables probably affect the institutional development with a time 
lag since it usually takes some time to implement institutional reforms. Hence, we introduce 
the first lags of the control variables to the estimation equation. Finally, one can also test for 
country and time effects. 
 
The issue of potential endogeneity of regressors is highly relevant to our analysis. If one 
regressor is correlated with the error term, the least-squares estimates of the coefficients are 
inconsistent. This is called the simultaneous equation bias (see for example Greene 2000, 
pp. 652–662; Cameron, Trivedi 2007, pp. 90–95 and Baltagi 2008, pp. 121–129). We 
hypothesize an influence of a European country’s status on the change in WGIs. However, 
the reverse is also likely to be true. As potential candidate, candidate and acceding countries 
improve their institutions, they are rewarded with a higher status. This corresponds to the 
conditionality principle discussed in Section 2 that a country’s status towards accession shall 
be linked to its institutional development. It is reasonable to assume a delay of the “reward” 
for at least one period, as the evaluation by the Commission and the political decision 
                                            
1 The hypothesis to be tested is conditional in nature. Being, for example, a potential candidate country is 
associated with an institutional improvement if the institutional development level is low, but not if the institutional 
development level is high. To be precisely, the improvement in the WGIs is the greater the lower the previous 
year WGI. 
2 Indeed, both statements (effect of the status depends on the previous period WGIs; level effect of previous 
period WGIs depends on the status) are logically symmetric. An interaction model cannot distinguish which 
variable (status or WGI) is the conditioning one (Kam, Franzese 2005, p. 13; Brambor et al. 2006, p. 72). Both 
statements are interesting on their own and we proceed to analyse both statements. 
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process take some time. Hence, the status variable in equation (1) is probably weakly 
exogenous or predetermined.  
 
As for the status variable, reverse causality may also apply to the control variables GDP per 
capita and openness. The growth and development literature, which tries to identify the effect 
of good institutions on economic development, struggles with the interrelationship between 
these variables (see the discussion in Section 2). Hence, one has to ensure that the control 
variables do not correlate with the error term. 
 
According to our considerations, we form the following estimation equation: 
(1) 0 1 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 3
4 , 1 5 , 1 ,
, i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i tWGI WGI WGI
GDP Trade
 
    
   
 
 
  
   
 
Status Status 
. 
1tWGI   is the lagged dependent variable, and its coefficient 1  indicates the persistence of 
the WGIs. The variable , 1i tStatus  is not continuous but a column vector of the status dummy 
variables , 1 , 1 , 1[ ,..., ]i t i t i tMBEA PCEU   Status . We omit the status dummy variable NO , 
which indicates the base group, to avoid the dummy variable trap. 2  and 3  are the 
corresponding vectors of coefficients, i  are the fixed effects, t  are the time effects, and 
,i t  is the disturbance term. , 1i tGDP   and , 1i tTrade   are the control variables GDP per capita 
in US dollars and trade as a percentage of the GDP. Trade is defined as imports plus 
exports. All the control variables are in logarithms.4  
 
The model can be considered to be for the level of or increase in the WGIs. Rearranging 
equation (1) yields  
(2) 0 1 , 1 , 1 2 , 1 , 1 3
4 , 1 5 , 1 ,
, 1)( i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i tWGI WGI WGI
GDP Trade
 
    
   
 
  
  
   
 
Status Status 
. 
This rearrangement clarifies that we are interested in explaining the speed of institutional 
development, i.e. the expected year-to-year changes in the WGIs. All the coefficients are 
identical but the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable becomes less intuitive to 
interpret. Therefore, we estimate equation (1) throughout the entire analysis.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
3 We also tested FDI as control variable. The motivation is that FDI inflow can induce a transfer of best practices 
and competition in a country. FDI turned out to be insignificant in every specification, so we dropped this control 
variable. 
4 It is not necessary to include time-invariant control variables to equation (1). Once we have to remove the fixed 
effects, all time-invariant determinants, which could affect institutional development and are correlated with the 
other regressors, are excluded from the estimation equation. 
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To illustrate the interpretation of the coefficients of the dummy variables and their interaction 
terms with the WGIs, we present the conditional expectations of equation (1). For the base 
group NO, the conditional expectation is 
(3) , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
0 1 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
,( | [ ,..., ] 0, , , , , )i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t
i tE WGI PCEU MBEA WGI GDP Trade
WGI GDP Trade
 
     
    
  
 
     . 
The WGIs are supposed to be state-dependent. Hence, the coefficient 1  is between 0 and 
1. For potential candidate countries (PCEU = 1), the conditional expectation of equation (1) is  
(4) 
, 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1
0 2 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
,( | 1,[ ,..., ] 0, , , , , )
) )( (
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
PCEU PCEU
i t i t i t i t
i tE WGI PCEU CCEU MBEA WGI GDP Trade
WGI GDP Trade
 
       
     
  
 
       . 
As we suppose a positive intercept shift and a reduction in persistence of the WGIs (slope 
shift), 2
PCEU  should be positive and 3PCEU negative, respectively. Hence, the differential 
intercept 2
PCEU  shifts up the line, whereas 3PCEU  lowers the slope of the line. The derivations 
of the conditional expectations for the other status dummy variables are analogous. 
 
In interaction models, the interpretation of the coefficients deserves some attention and 
carefulness. The coefficient of a constitutive term, that is one of the elements that constitutes 
an interaction term, for example 1  or 2 , must not be interpreted as the marginal or average 
effect of a change in the independent variable on the dependent variable.5 The coefficient 2  
only captures the effect of 1tStatus   on tWGI  when 1tWGI   is zero. For example, a country 
with world average quality in institutions (governance indicator is zero) experiences an 
increase in its institutional quality by 2  if it was a potential candidate country for the EU last 
year. Moreover, the standard errors of interest are not those of 2  or 3 , but of 
1 2 3 1
t
t
WGI
tStatus WGI     . Hence, the standard error of interest can be calculated as6: 
(5) 
1
2
2 1 3 1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆvar( ) var( ) 2 cov( )ˆ WGIt
Statust
t tWGI WGI    
 
     . 
We calculated the standard errors and confidence intervals for all the status variables 
depending on the previous year governance indicator when presenting the estimation results 
in Section 5. Being a potential candidate country (PCEU = 1) has an effect on a WGI if the 
                                            
5 Brambor et al. (2006) provide a valuable discussion of what to do and not to do with interaction models.  
6 In interaction models of the type 0 1 2 3Y X Z XZ         , where Z  is the conditioning variable, the 
standard error of the marginal effect of X  on Y  is  (Brambor et al. 2006, p. 70) 
2
1 3 1 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ var( ) var( ) 2 cov( )
Y X
Z Z         . 
12 
 
coefficient on PCEU or its interaction term is not zero. To test for significance, one simply 
has to perform a F-test on the null-hypothesis that 2 3 0
PCEU PCEU   .  
 
The equation (1) is estimated for each one of the six Worldwide Governance Indicators with 
two-way fixed effects OLS.7 The fixed-effects estimator is generally biased in dynamic 
models. This is known as the Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). However, as T gets large, the fixed 
effects estimator becomes consistent (Baltagi 2008, p. 147). The sample period is sufficiently 
large that the bias should not be large in this estimation. The alternative estimators that are 
usually used in the dynamic panel data context are the Anderson–Hsiao estimator and the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedures, such as the Arellano–Bond estimator, 
Arellano–Bover estimator and Blundell–Bond estimator, yet they are particularly suited to 
short panels with T  fixed and N  (Cameron, Trivedi 2007, p. 744). Short panels 
comprise few periods but many individuals (usually several hundreds of people or firms), 
whereas long panels comprise many time periods with relatively few individuals (for example 
countries) so that inference can be based on the assumption that T  (Cameron, Trivedi 
2007, pp. 721–723). Our sample can be characterized as intermediate, between a short and 
a long panel, as it comprises 33 European countries, which are in some way affiliated with 
the EU, and 23 control countries over up to 17 years.8 
 
 
4 Data 
4.1 Worldwide Governance indicators  
 
To measure institutional development, we employ the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGIs) of the World Bank produced by Kaufmann et al. (2013).9, 10 The WGIs consist of six 
composite indicators capturing governance perception. The six dimensions of governance 
are Voice and Accountability (VaA), Control of Corruption (CoC), Government Effectiveness 
(GE), Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PSNV), Rule of Law (RoL) and Regulatory 
Quality (RQ). The WGIs are composed of several hundred variables obtained from surveys 
of firms and households and subjective assessments collected by commercial business 
providers, non-governmental organizations, multilateral organizations and other public sector 
                                            
7 Our results were obtained using R 2.15.2 with the packages plm 1.3-1, lmtest 0.9-32 and car 2.0-19 (R Core 
Team 2012; Croissant, Millo 2008; Zeileis, Hothorn 2002; Fox, Weisberg 2011). 
8 See also Deutsche Bundesbank (2012, pp. 23–25) for an empirical application to a similar sample as well as 
Alesina et al. (2010), both of which apply a fixed-effects estimator.  
9 For a detailed description of the WGI methodology, see Kaufmann et al. (2010).  
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bodies. The variables are clustered along the six dimensions of governance by an 
unobserved components model. By following this method, it is possible to construct margins 
of error, which indicate the underlying uncertainty, and assign weights according to the 
informative signal of the source (Kaufmann et al. 2010, pp. 5–11). The WGIs are normally 
distributed, with zero mean and ranging approximately from –2.5 to 2.5. Table 1 describes 
the six dimensions of the WGIs.  
 
Table 1 Description of the six dimensions of the WGIs 
Voice and Accountability 
(VaA) 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and free media.  
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence/ 
Terrorism (PSNV) 
Capturing perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically motivated violence and terrorism.  
Government 
Effectiveness (GE) 
Capturing perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to such policies.  
Regulatory Quality (RQ) Capturing perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
Rule of Law (RoL) Capturing perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence.  
Control of Corruption 
(CoC) 
Capturing perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests.  
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010, p. 4) 
 
The indicators cover the years 1996–2012 and are available on a two-year basis until 2002 
and on a yearly basis subsequently. Hence, we have to handle the missing data problem for 
the WGIs in 1997, 1999 and 2001. Since the lack of these WGIs depends neither on their 
value nor on the values of other variables in the dataset, they are missing completely at 
random (for a discussion of missing data assumptions and their consequences, see 
Cameron, Trivedi 2007, pp. 923–941).  
 
There are two simple ways to handle missing data in this case: listwise deletion11 and mean 
imputation. The former has several disadvantages. Since 3 out of 17 observations (time 
dimension) are missing, deletion leads to a substantial reduction in the total number of 
observations. Even more information is lost if we calculate the year-to-year changes in the 
                                                                                                                                        
10 The field of economic governance analyses the “performance of different institutions under different conditions, 
the evolution of these institutions, and the transitions from one set of institutions to another” (Dixit 2008). 
Important measures of institutional quality are the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs). 
11 Listwise deletion means reducing the sample to complete observations (Cameron, Trivedi 2007, p. 925).  
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WGIs, which indicate institutional development. Then the sample is essentially cut to 2003–
2012. One possibility to mitigate this problem is to calculate two-year changes in the 
variables and skip the information for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. This is 
carried out in Section 6 as a robustness check. The second way to handle missing data is 
mean imputation. Thereby, missing WGIs are replaced by the average value of the previous-
and following-period WGIs for each country. The disadvantage is that this could have an 
impact on the distribution of the WGIs and therefore could affect the covariances with other 
variables. Nevertheless, we favour the latter way to handle the missing WGI problem to 
retain as much information as possible.  
 
There are several potential problems with the WGIs to discuss as we use the cross-section 
and time dimension in our analysis.12 As the WGIs are constructed to have a zero mean in 
each period, comparisons of WGIs over time could be a problem. Kaufmann et al. (2007, pp. 
3–4) argue that this could indeed be problematic for absolute changes in the WGIs. 
However, relative comparisons of individual countries or country groups are not affected and 
valid, even if the world averages have changed over time. Indeed, the world averages of the 
underlying sources show little evidence of significant trends, as Kaufmann et al. show in 
previous works. Hence, this allows the interpretation of relative changes as absolute changes 
in individual or groups of countries (Kaufmann et al. 2007, pp. 3–4). A further point of 
criticism is that the WGIs might be too imprecise to yield sensible comparisons over time or 
countries. This criticism could be applied to every governance indicator because of 
measurement errors. However, the WGIs aggregate the existing indicators and hence their 
information about governance. Above that, margins of errors are computed, which allows the 
testing for significance in differences (Kaufmann et al. 2007, pp. 10–11). 
 
4.2 Status dummy variables 
 
To indicate the status or official relationship of the countries of our sample with the EU and 
the euro area, we construct a set of dummy variables. The sample covers 56 countries, 
among which are 33 European countries, which have been at least a potential candidate at 
some point in time (1996–2012) according to the classification in Table 2. The remaining 23 
countries are other OECD countries and other European and Central Asian developing 
countries as defined by the World Bank. A full list is presented in the appendix. 
 
 
                                            
12 This and other critiques are discussed in Kaufmann et al. (2007). 
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Table 2 Classification of the status dummy variables 
Status Abbreviation for Classification Source 
MBEA Member State in 
the euro area 
EU Member State at Stage Three of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, i.e. Member 
State in the euro area 
(European Central 
Bank 2011, pp. 10–
11) 
CCEA Candidate 
country for the 
euro area 
EU Member State with derogation, i.e. a 
Member State preparing to adopt the euro but 
has not yet done so (other than Sweden) 
(European Central 
Bank 2012, p. 64; 
European Union 
2012) 
ACEU Acceding country 
for the EU 
Country that has signed the treaty of accession (European 
Commission 2012) 
CCEU Candidate 
country for the EU 
Applicant country for EU membership that has 
been granted candidate country status by the 
European Council 
(European 
Commission 2012, 
2003, pp. 34–35; 
European Council 
2012) 
PCEU Potential 
candidate for the 
EU 
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
which have signed Europe agreements; 
countries of the Western Balkans involved in 
the stabilization and association process, 
which are not yet candidate countries; 6 
Western Balkans countries were identified as 
potential candidates during the Thessaloniki 
European Council summit in 2003; the 
European Council confirmed a clear European 
perspective for Kosovo in 2008; in 2009 
Iceland applied to join the EU 
(European 
Commission 2012, 
2003, pp. 4–7; 
European Council 
2012) 
NO No status Other  
Notes: Many countries were granted candidate status at European Council meetings in December. As one should 
expect no effect for the respective year, our dummy variables generally display all the changes in the status 
occurring during the months November and December in the following year. Beyond that, we assign all the 
Member States that adopted the euro in 1999 the status CCEA until 1998. EU Member States that have been 
granted exemption from participating in the third stage of the Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. the United 
Kingdom and Denmark) and Sweden, which is de facto not willing to introduce the euro (see European Central 
Bank 2012, p. 64; European Union 2012), are not considered here. 
 
The notation and classification of a country’s status are based on the official specifications of 
the European Union and the European Central Bank. However, they are not identical in the 
case of Sweden and the potential candidates. Originally, the EU named countries involved in 
the stabilization and association process in the Western Balkans potential candidates, which 
are not yet official candidate countries (European Commission 2012). We extend this term to 
all the countries involved in a pre-accession strategy of the EU according to the definition in 
Table 2. Sweden, which is officially a EU Member States with derogation, is not considered 
here, as Sweden is de facto not willing to introduce the euro. For example, it did not 
participate in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM and ERM II) in the relevant 
period.  
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5 Results 
 
We first present some descriptive statistics and perform a graphical analysis. The WGI 
summary statistics of our sample are reported in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 Summary statistics of the WGIs  
 VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
Min. –2.2097   –1.4952   –1.6757   –2.2431   –1.6924   –2.1762   
1st Qu. –0.1855   –0.5226   –0.3719   –0.2970   –0.4889   –0.1083   
Median  0.8870    0.3591    0.7271    0.5025    0.7514    0.8978   
Mean  0.4951    0.4881    0.5964    0.3205    0.4783    0.6094   
3rd Qu.  1.3137    1.4405    1.5760    1.0095    1.4304    1.3480   
Max.  1.8073    2.5856    2.2644    1.6681    1.9875    2.0766   
NA’s 4   14   19   22   14   20   
 
The mean of the WGIs of our sample is above zero (0.32–0.60) and the median ranges from 
0.35–0.90. This indicates that most of the countries of our sample have had better institutions 
than the world average. Interestingly, the median for each indicator is higher than its mean 
except for CoC. Hence, there are some countries with very high control of corruption, but 
many countries have an undersized control of corruption. To show the institutional 
development of European countries that have been at least potential candidates at some 
point in time, we present scatterplots in Figure 1. One can see an improvement of the WGIs 
from 1996 to 2012 in the least performing countries, especially for VaA, RoL and RQ. In 
contrast, the best performing countries have not improved further.  
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Figure 1 Scatterplots of the WGIs over time 
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Figure 1 continued 
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Note: The figure displays the WGIs for 33 European countries from 1996 to 2012. 
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Table 4 displays the mean values of the WGIs depending on the status. Unsurprisingly, the 
mean values of the indicators increase from PCEU to MBEA. As expected, the institutional 
development level is positively associated with the steps towards EU membership and the 
introduction of the euro. This is in line with the conditionality principle, as discussed in 
Section 2 
 
Table 4 Mean values of the WGIs depending on the status 
 VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
NO 0.02 0.22 0.3 0.01 0.13 0.25 
PCEU 0.25 –0.23 –0.11 –0.1 –0.23 0.1 
CCEU 0.54 0.2 0.4 0.23 0.29 0.58 
ACEU 0.84 0.37 0.6 0.71 0.49 0.85 
CCEA 0.99 0.65 0.89 0.77 0.86 1.07 
MBEA 1.29 1.36 1.42 0.86 1.36 1.35 
 
Table 5 displays the mean values of the first-differenced WGIs, i.e. the year-to-year changes 
in the WGIs, depending on the status. The evidence is not conclusive but there is a tendency 
for countries in the early stages of EU accession to have experienced greater improvements 
in the WGIs than euro area members and Member States preparing to adopt the euro. For 
almost all the indicators, countries with the PCEU, CCEU and ACEU status experienced an 
improvement in their WGIs. For most indicators, their average changes are considerably 
higher than the average changes of the control group NO. On the contrary, members of the 
euro area have negative or zero average changes in their WGIs. The average changes are 
also quite small and partly negative for CCEA. 
 
Table 5 Mean values of the first-differenced WGIs depending on the status 
 VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
NO 0.0095 0.0065 0.0104 0.009 0.0093 0.0119 
PCEU 0.0135 0.0317 0.0143 –0.0233 0.0411 0.0293 
CCEU 0.0118 0.0047 0.0298 0.0188 0.0114 0.0242 
ACEU –0.0089 0.0941 0.0212 0.0627 0.0302 –0.0029 
CCEA –0.0129 0.0053 0.0138 –0.0107 0.0126 0 
MBEA –0.0054 –0.0195 –0.0188 –0.0194 –0.0053 –0.0009 
 
Now we turn to the estimates of equation (1). Table 6 shows the results of six regressions; in 
each regression, one governance indicator is the dependent variable. The regressions are 
estimated by two-way within OLS. Panel robust standard errors allowing for 
heteroscedasticity across countries and serial correlation are reported. 
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Table 6 Two-way within OLS estimates with annual data 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(WGI) 0.8009 
(0.0198) *** 
0.7784 
(0.0224) *** 
0.7963  
(0.036) *** 
0.703  
(0.0337) *** 
0.8218 
(0.0299) *** 
0.7819 
(0.0319) *** 
lag(Status)PCEU –0.0233 
(0.0265)   
0.0146 
(0.0224)   
0.0268 
(0.0257)   
0.0288 
(0.0334)   
0.0347 
(0.0245)   
0.0545 
(0.0183) *** 
lag(Status)CCEU 0.063  
(0.0542)   
0.0416 
(0.0449)   
0.1061 
(0.0269) *** 
0.0762 
(0.0408) * 
0.0383 
(0.0263)   
0.0455 
(0.0414)   
lag(Status)ACEU 0.1688 
(0.0801) ** 
0.0379  
(0.082)   
0.0558 
(0.0504)   
0.0396 
(0.0809)   
0.0763 
(0.0411) * 
0.2065 
(0.0751) *** 
lag(Status)CCEA 0.0217 
(0.0511)   
0.0142 
(0.0499)   
0.0544 
(0.0408)   
0.0549 
(0.0553)   
0.0524 
(0.0386)   
0.0483 
(0.0614)   
lag(Status)MBEA 0.0098  
(0.074)   
–0.1302 
(0.0618) ** 
0.0286 
(0.0435)   
–0.0844 
(0.0728)   
0.0329 
(0.0341)   
0.0675 
(0.0645)   
lag(GDP_per_capita_US) –0.0353 
(0.0317)   
0.0415 
(0.0378)   
0.1253 
(0.0408) *** 
0.1929 
(0.0598) *** 
0.0929 
(0.0379) ** 
0.1284 
(0.0441) *** 
lag(Trade) 0.0194 
(0.0253)   
0.0363 
(0.0326)   
0.0638 
(0.0422)   
0.1113 
(0.0668) * 
0.0648 
(0.0279) ** 
0.0752 
(0.0335) ** 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)PCEU 0.0052 
(0.0446)   
–0.0511 
(0.0296) * 
–0.076 
(0.0282) *** 
–0.0398 
(0.0328)   
–0.034 
(0.0193) * 
–0.0608  
(0.04)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEU –0.1005 
(0.0525) * 
–0.111 
(0.0255) *** 
–0.1355 
(0.0286) *** 
–0.1255 
(0.0358) *** 
–0.0701 
(0.0196) *** 
–0.0534 
(0.0527)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)ACEU –0.2427 
(0.083) *** 
–0.0965 
(0.118)   
–0.1313 
(0.0453) *** 
–0.2096 
(0.0847) ** 
–0.1695 
(0.0435) *** 
–0.213 
(0.0719) *** 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEA –0.0571 
(0.0475)   
–0.0284 
(0.032)   
–0.0155  
(0.03)   
–0.086 
(0.0504) * 
–0.0461 
(0.025) * 
–0.0521 
(0.0579)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)MBEA –0.0575 
(0.0654)   
0.0341  
(0.043)   
–0.0444 
(0.0334)   
–0.0351 
(0.0539)   
–0.0504 
(0.0261) * 
–0.0702 
(0.0488)   
r2/r2adj. 0.7318/0.6614 0.7094/0.6409 0.7265/0.6562 0.5898/0.5326 0.7831/0.7075 0.6934/0.6262 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; lag() denotes lagged one period; sample: 1996–2012, 56 countries, 
unbalanced panel because of data availability; two-way fixed-effects OLS estimator; panel robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
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We first discuss whether the status has any effect on the WGIs, which corresponds to the 
null-hypothesis 2 3 0   . The F-tests on this null-hypothesis are presented in Table 7 for 
each regression and status variable. One can conclude that the status PCEU has a 
significant effect on the governance indicators GE and RQ at the 5% level and additionally on 
CoC and RoL at the 10% level. Being a candidate country or an acceding country 
significantly influences almost all WGIs. On the other hand, being a Member State preparing 
for the introduction of the euro or a euro area country does not influence the governance 
indicators. The only exception is effect of the status MBEA on CoC, which is significant at the 
10% level. 
 
Table 7 F-tests on linear hypotheses 
 P-values of the F-tests on the six regressions 
Null-hypothesis VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(Status)PCEU=0, 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)PCEU=0 
0.5958 0.093 0.0218 0.2092 0.0665 0.0003 
lag(Status)CCEU=0, 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEU=0 
0.1409 0 0 0.0008 0.0016 0.5176 
lag(Status)ACEU=0, 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)ACEU=0 
0.0085 0.7156 0.0126 0.012 0.0005 0.0108 
lag(Status)CCEA=0, 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEA=0 
0.4127 0.6588 0.4117 0.2251 0.1583 0.6583 
lag(Status)MBEA=0, 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)MBEA=0 
0.3657 0.0848 0.4132 0.1477 0.1443 0.3561 
Note: Estimates of panel robust covariance matrixes allowing for heteroskedasticity across countries and serial 
correlation are applied. 
 
We proceed by interpreting the model both ways: first, when 1tStatus    is the conditioning 
variable; second, when 1tWGI   is the conditioning variable. Both statements are logically 
symmetric and cannot be distinguished when estimating an interaction model (Kam, 
Franzese 2005, p. 13; Brambor et al. 2006, p. 72). The first case allows for different 
intercepts and slopes for the level effect of the WGIs depending on the status. Table 6 shows 
that the WGIs are state-dependent for all six dimensions. The coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variables are within a range of 0.70 to 0.82 and highly significant. The coefficients 
of the status dummy variables are mostly positive, with a few exceptions, which corresponds 
to an upward intercept shift of the regression line (we call it the direct effect). The prospect 
for joining the EU has significant direct effects on the indicators VaA, GE and RQ: being a 
CCEU speeds up the development of GE, and being an ACEU contributes positively to VaA. 
Potential candidate countries and acceding countries experience an improvement in RQ. 
There are no significant direct effects for CCEA. For the indicator CoC, the coefficient of 
MBEA is negative and significant at the 5% level. Thus, there seems to be a direct negative 
effect of being a euro area country on CoC. 
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Candidate and acceding countries experience a significant reduction in institutional 
persistence for almost all the WGIs (which we call the indirect effect of the status). The 
coefficients of the interaction terms are negative and significant. For GE, the institutional 
persistence also decreases in potential candidate countries (for CoC and RoL, the 
significance is at the 10% level). In contrast, Member States preparing for the introduction of 
the euro and euro area countries hardly experience a significant influence on their 
institutional development path. The marginal effects of 1tWGI   on tWGI  depending on the 
status are shown in Table 8. The institutional persistence is the lowest for candidate and 
acceding countries.  
 
Table 8 Marginal effects and hypothesis tests on whether WGIt-1 affects WGI 
 VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
PCEU=1 0.8061 
(0.0474) *** 
0.7273 
(0.0377) *** 
0.7203 
(0.0453) *** 
0.6633 
(0.0321) *** 
0.7878 
(0.0367) *** 
0.7211 
(0.0332) *** 
CCEU=1 0.7004 
(0.0512) *** 
0.6674 
(0.0298) *** 
0.6608 
(0.0444) *** 
0.5775 
(0.0391) *** 
0.7516 
(0.0339) *** 
0.7285 
(0.0483) *** 
ACEU=1 0.5582 
(0.0848) *** 
0.6819 
(0.1191) *** 
0.665 
(0.0582) *** 
0.4934 
(0.0842) *** 
0.6523 
(0.0506) *** 
0.5689 
(0.0716) *** 
CCEA=1 0.7439 
(0.047) *** 
0.75 
(0.0355) *** 
0.7808 
(0.0326) *** 
0.617 
(0.0454) *** 
0.7757 
(0.0325) *** 
0.7298 
(0.0524) *** 
MBEA=1 0.7434 
(0.0636) *** 
0.8125 
(0.0453) *** 
0.7519 
(0.0267) *** 
0.6679 
(0.0468) *** 
0.7714 
(0.0265) *** 
0.7117 
(0.0418) *** 
Notes: The table displays the conditional coefficient dWGIt /dWGIt-1 and the corresponding standard error (in 
parentheses). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
In Table 6, we see that the control variable GDP per capita is positive and significant for most 
of the indicators, as expected. Trade is positive and significant for RoL and RQ at the 5% 
level and for PSNV at the 10% level. 
 
Now, we evaluate the statement that the marginal effect of the status may depend on the 
level of the WGIs. For this, we calculated the standard errors and confidence intervals for the 
marginal effects of all the status variables depending on the previous year governance 
indicator. Figure 2 to Figure 7 illustrate how the marginal effect of 1tStatus   changes across a 
country’s level in institutional development. The solid line shows the marginal effect of 
1tStatus   depending on 1tWGI   and the dashed lines are the confidence intervals. From 
Figure 4, one can see that the effect of becoming a potential candidate country is statistically 
significant at conventional levels for relatively low institutionally developed countries (with 
government effectiveness below approx. –0.4). In contrast, there is no statistically significant 
effect for institutionally high-developed countries. It is useful to complement the insights of 
Table 6 and Figure 4 with a quantitative assessment of the impact of being a potential 
candidate country on the government effectiveness. Let us assume that Albania, whose 
government effectiveness indicator scored –0.80 in 1996, would have been a potential 
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candidate in 1996. This would have raised Albania’s indicator score by 0.09 in 1997 holding 
other variables constant. Once the GE scores more than –0.4, the effect of being a potential 
candidate on GE is not statistically significant different from zero any more.  
 
Over all WGIs, a quite homogenous picture emerges. Being a PCEU has a significant and 
positive effect on the improvement of four WGIs when the institutional development level is 
low (below world average). The same applies to CCEU for slightly other WGIs, but the 
marginal effect is as twice as large. For most WGIs, the effect is even greater when a country 
is an acceding country to the EU. However, the standard errors are also considerably larger 
for ACEU. Moreover, potential candidates, candidates and acceding countries with relatively 
low developed institutions benefit the most from the EU accession process. In contrast, high 
institutionally developed potential candidates, candidates and acceding countries do not 
experience any significant improvement of their institutions because of the EU accession.  
 
To better judge the substantive implication of the results, we provide boxplots of the sample 
for all WGIs (Figure 8). By this, one can see approximately the percentage of the sample that 
falls within the region of significance. Around half of the observations for countries with the 
status NO and PCEU are located within the region, where marginal effects of PCEU, CCEU 
and ACEU are significant. Moreover, roughly 25% of the observations of candidate countries 
for the EU lie within this region. Hence, one can conclude that being a PCEU, CCEU or 
ACEU has a positive effect on institutional development. 
 
The marginal effect of being a CCEA or an MBEA is insignificant for most WGIs except for 
CoC. There is a significant negative marginal effect of being a member of the euro area on 
CoC if the indicator CoC of the previous year scores between –0.3 to 1.0. This is of high 
policy relevance. For members of the euro area, around 25% of the observations fall within 
this range. In seven members of the euro area, the CoC indicator scores below one in 
2012.13 75% of the observations of Member States that have not yet introduced the euro lie 
below 1.0. All new Member States have an undersized control of corruption in 2012. They 
are all members of the EMU with derogation, and some of them recently introduced the euro.  
 
To conclude, there is evidence that potential candidate, candidate and acceding countries 
perform better than the control group. In particular, prospective EU membership reduces the 
persistence of institutional development. There are virtually no differences in the 
                                            
13 These countries are Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. 
24 
 
performance of Member States preparing to adopt the euro, euro area members and the 
control group NO. The only exception is the negative impact of being an MBEA on CoC. 
 
Figure 2 The marginal effect of Statust-1 on VaA 
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Figure 3 The marginal effect of Statust-1 on CoC 
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Figure 4 The marginal effect of Statust-1 on GE 
-2 -1 0 1 2
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
GE(t-1)
M
ar
ig
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f P
C
E
U
(t-
1)
95% Confidence interval
-2 -1 0 1 2
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
GE(t-1)
M
ar
ig
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f C
C
E
U
(t-
1)
95% Confidence interval
-2 -1 0 1 2
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
GE(t-1)
M
ar
ig
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f A
C
E
U
(t-
1)
95% Confidence interval
-2 -1 0 1 2
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
GE(t-1)
M
ar
ig
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f C
C
E
A
(t-
1)
95% Confidence interval
-2 -1 0 1 2
-0
.4
-0
.2
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
GE(t-1)
M
ar
ig
na
l e
ffe
ct
 o
f M
B
E
A
(t-
1)
95% Confidence interval
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Figure 5 The marginal effect of Statust-1 on PSNV 
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Figure 6 The marginal effect of Statust-1 on RoL 
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Figure 7 The marginal effect of Statust-1 of RQ 
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Figure 8 Boxplots of the sample: WGIs grouped by the status variable 
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6 Robustness checks 
 
To verify that our results are robust to model and data specifications, we re-estimate 
equation (1) firstly using biannual data and secondly splitting the sample in two, one part for 
the issue of EU accession and the other for the issue of the introduction of the euro.14 
Additionally, we estimate equation (1) with biannual data using the Blundell–Bond system 
GMM. Our previous conclusions are largely confirmed.  
 
The use of biannual data on the entire sample is motivated by the lack of WGIs for the years 
1997, 1999 and 2001. As discussed in Section 4.1, mean imputation could have an impact 
on the distribution of the WGIs and therefore could affect the covariances with other 
variables. Hence, we drop the information for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 
and use biannual data as a robustness check. Due to the small number of observations, we 
also have to merge the statuses ACEU and CCEU. The estimates and tests are presented in 
the appendix (Table 13). The results are quite similar to those of our main specification. The 
coefficients of the lagged dependent variables are now more strongly downward biased, as 
one would expect due to the Nickell bias. The prospect for joining the EU has positive direct 
effects on the speed of institutional development, which is significant for most indicators and 
particularly for CCEU. Now, even Member States preparing for the introduction of the euro 
experience positive direct effect on GE and RoL (significant at the 10% level). Again, being a 
member of the euro area is associated with significant impairment of CoC. With respect to 
the indirect effect of the status, one can confirm a reduction of persistence related to being a 
CCEU. This effect is highly significant for all the indicators except one. However, the bias of 
the coefficients of the endogenous and potentially weak exogenous variables is higher in a 
biannual setting as the number of periods diminishes to T = 9. It is possible to determine the 
direction of the bias for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable but not for the other 
regressors. Therefore, we prefer to use annual data below. 
 
The second way to confirm robustness is to split the sample into two, one part for the issue 
of EU accession and the other for the issue of the introduction of the euro. The first sample 
covers the new Member States, acceding countries, candidate countries, potential candidate 
countries and other European and Central Asian developing countries as defined by the 
                                            
14 Additionally, we re-estimate this specification using trade with the EU and the euro area instead of the overall 
trade as a percentage of the GDP as we believe the directions of trade to be relevant to our setting. First, the 
former soviet countries displayed very tide and wide trade connections among each other just after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. However, this hardly led to an “import” of good institutions. Second, the variables “trade with the 
EU” and “trade with the euro area” are probably more strongly correlated with the status of a country in the EU 
and the euro area than overall trade. However, the results basically do not change. They are available from the 
authors on request. The results of the basic estimation are displayed in the appendix (Table 17). 
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World Bank (Table 11). The statuses CCEA and MBEA are merged into the status “Member 
State of EU” (MBEU). The estimates and tests are present in the appendix (Table 14). They 
confirm the high persistence of the WGIs, which is reduced by the prospect of entering the 
EU. Even being a Member State (MBEU) reduces the persistence of VaA, CoC and PSNV. 
However, there is little evidence of direct effects of status on the WGIs; only a few 
coefficients are weakly significant. The effect of PCEU on RQ is at least jointly significant. 
 
Concerning the introduction of the euro, the second sample covers all the euro area 
countries and other OECD countries (Table 12). There are just three statuses: NO, CCEA 
and MBEA. The high persistence of the WGIs is confirmed as well as the negative direct 
effect of MBEA on CoC. The effect of the status CCEA on CoC is at least jointly significant. 
Moreover, being a CCEA increases the persistence of GE, which also applies to MBEA on 
GE and CoC. Finally, there is some indication that RoL could be more persistent for CCEA. 
 
The use of biannual data reduces the number of observation periods from T = 17 to T = 9, 
which allows the application of the system GMM estimator as proposed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The system GMM estimator is particular suited to short samples, in which the 
autoregressive parameter is moderately high. Moreover, system GMM allows the estimation 
of coefficients of time-invariant variables. Even though we do not have time-invariant 
variables in our specification, the use of the cross-section variation improves the estimation 
as the status dummy variables vary only a little over time. To avoid the problem of instrument 
proliferation, we restrict the instrument count as described by Roodman (2009), first by 
restricting the lags to be used for instruments instead of using all the available lags and 
second by “collapsing” the instrument matrix. The estimates, significance and specification 
tests are reported in Table 16. The GMM results are very weak for the indicators PSNV and 
RQ, for which the coefficients of the status variables and the interaction terms are all 
insignificant. Regarding the membership in the euro area, the negative impact on CoC is 
again confirmed. The GMM results also show a significant negative impact of being a euro 
area member on RoL. In contrast, we see a positive influence of being a member of the euro 
area on the development of VaA. By and large, the GMM results confirm our previous 
conclusions. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we investigated the speed and direction of institutional development induced by 
European integration. We can confirm a positive effect of EU enlargement on institutional 
development. The positive effect of EU enlargement operates mainly through breaking the 
path dependence of institutional development. Hence, we can confirm the results of the 
empirical literature on transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The novel finding of this paper is that once countries have become EU Member States or 
even introduced the euro, their institutional development loses momentum. The worries that 
new Member States could quickly reverse their reforms are not supported empirically. 
However, we have robust evidence that members of the euro area underperform in one 
particular area of institutional development, namely control of corruption. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 9 Control variables 
Variable Description Source 
GDP_per_capita_US GDP per capita in US dollars in logarithms (World Bank 2012) 
Trade Trade (% of GDP) in logarithms (World Bank 2012) 
Trade.to.EA.GDP Trade with the euro area (% of GDP) in 
logarithms 
(International Monetary 
Fund 2013) 
Trade.to.EU.GDP Trade with the EU (% of GDP) in logarithms (International Monetary 
Fund 2013) 
Trade.to.EU.excl.EA.GDP Trade with the EU exclusive of the euro area 
(% of GDP) in logarithms 
(International Monetary 
Fund 2013) 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 Countries of the whole sample 
ALBANIA GREECE NETHERLANDS 
ARMENIA HUNGARY NEW ZEALAND 
AUSTRALIA ICELAND NORWAY 
AUSTRIA IRELAND POLAND 
AZERBAIJAN ISRAEL PORTUGAL 
BELARUS ITALY ROMANIA 
BELGIUM JAPAN RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA KAZAKHSTAN SERBIA 
BULGARIA KOREA, REP. SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
CANADA KOSOVO SLOVENIA 
CHILE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC SPAIN 
CROATIA LATVIA SWITZERLAND 
CYPRUS LITHUANIA TAJIKISTAN 
CZECH REPUBLIC LUXEMBOURG TURKEY 
ESTONIA MACEDONIA, FYR TURKMENISTAN 
FINLAND MALTA UKRAINE 
FRANCE MEXICO UNITED STATES 
GEORGIA MOLDOVA UZBEKISTAN 
GERMANY MONTENEGRO  
 
 
 
 
Table 11 Countries of the EU sample 
ALBANIA HUNGARY ROMANIA 
ARMENIA KAZAKHSTAN RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
AZERBAIJAN KOSOVO SERBIA 
BELARUS KYRGYZ REPUBLIC SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA LATVIA SLOVENIA 
BULGARIA LITHUANIA TAJIKISTAN 
CROATIA MACEDONIA, FYR TURKEY 
CYPRUS MALTA TURKMENISTAN 
CZECH REPUBLIC MOLDOVA UKRAINE 
ESTONIA MONTENEGRO UZBEKISTAN 
GEORGIA POLAND  
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Table 12 Countries of the EA sample 
AUSTRALIA GREECE NEW ZEALAND 
AUSTRIA IRELAND NORWAY 
BELGIUM ISRAEL PORTUGAL 
CANADA ITALY SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
CHILE JAPAN SLOVENIA 
CYPRUS KOREA, REP. SPAIN 
ESTONIA LUXEMBOURG SWITZERLAND 
FINLAND MALTA UNITED STATES 
FRANCE MEXICO  
GERMANY NETHERLANDS  
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Table 13 Two-way within OLS estimates with biannual data 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(WGI) 0.474  
(0.037) *** 
0.5148 
(0.0465) *** 
0.6133 
(0.0611) *** 
0.2881 
(0.0642) *** 
0.587  
(0.0648) *** 
0.4713 
(0.0664) *** 
lag(Status)PCEU 0.0564 
(0.0469)   
0.0332 
(0.0663)   
0.0364 
(0.0457)   
0.081  
(0.1057)   
0.0851 
(0.0389) ** 
0.0931 
(0.0364) ** 
lag(Status)CCEU 0.2364 
(0.0853) *** 
0.0946 
(0.1033)   
0.1865 
(0.0471) *** 
0.1832  
(0.097) * 
0.0909 
(0.0399) ** 
0.0977 
(0.0762)   
lag(Status)CCEA 0.1348 
(0.0969)   
0.0489 
(0.1094)   
0.1269 
(0.0712) * 
0.1037 
(0.1322)   
0.113  
(0.0584) * 
0.0565 
(0.1091)   
lag(Status)MBEA 0.0585 
(0.1256)   
–0.2698 
(0.1239) ** 
0.058  
(0.083)   
–0.2083 
(0.1647)   
0.0215 
(0.0607)   
0.1134 
(0.1397)   
lag(GDP_per_capita_US) –0.0732 
(0.0667)   
0.0788 
(0.0738)   
0.1885 
(0.0663) *** 
0.4788 
(0.1108) *** 
0.1811  
(0.066) *** 
0.2602 
(0.0862) *** 
lag(Trade) 0.0492  
(0.054)   
0.0562  
(0.07)   
0.1008 
(0.0827)   
0.1251  
(0.105)   
0.0993 
(0.0593) * 
0.1068 
(0.0701)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)PCEU –0.0164 
(0.0807)   
–0.1013  
(0.07)   
–0.0441 
(0.0529)   
–0.0538 
(0.077)   
–0.0109 
(0.0478)   
–0.0016 
(0.0718)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEU –0.2252 
(0.0666) *** 
–0.2334 
(0.0509) *** 
–0.2312 
(0.0514) *** 
–0.2956 
(0.0723) *** 
–0.1214 
(0.0358) *** 
–0.0584 
(0.1002)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEA –0.1035 
(0.0881)   
–0.0705 
(0.0563)   
–0.0161 
(0.0565)   
–0.0894 
(0.1001)   
–0.0405 
(0.041)   
–0.0095 
(0.1069)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)MBEA –0.0633 
(0.1092)   
0.0738 
(0.0624)   
–0.0675 
(0.0632)   
0.0345 
(0.1013)   
–0.0173 
(0.0474)   
–0.0894 
(0.1024)   
r2/r2adj. 0.3632/0.3017 0.4089/0.3393 0.5512/0.4572 0.2963/0.2457 0.5422/0.45 0.3643/0.302 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; lag() denotes lagged one period; sample: 1996–2012, biannual, 
56 countries, unbalanced panel because of data availability; two-way fixed-effects OLS estimator; panel robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 14 Two-way within OLS estimates with annual data and EU sample 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(WGI) 0.8364 
(0.0226) *** 
0.8358 
(0.0319) *** 
0.816  
(0.0526) *** 
0.7175 
(0.0425) *** 
0.8529 
(0.0329) *** 
0.7576 
(0.0507) *** 
lag(Status)PCEU –0.0446 
(0.0256) * 
–0.0555 
(0.0397)   
–0.0067 
(0.0446)   
–0.0043 
(0.0438)   
0.0152 
(0.0455)   
0.0513 
(0.0316)   
lag(Status)CCEU 0.0489  
(0.052)   
–0.0435 
(0.0608)   
0.0579 
(0.0445)   
0.0375 
(0.0585)   
0.0217 
(0.0449)   
0.0269 
(0.0463)   
lag(Status)ACEU 0.0678 
(0.0675)   
–0.0433 
(0.0962)   
–0.0051 
(0.066)   
–0.0287 
(0.0882)   
0.0605 
(0.0605)   
0.1727 
(0.0911) * 
lag(Status)MBEU 0.0066 
(0.0519)   
–0.0839 
(0.0664)   
0.0044 
(0.0584)   
0.0419 
(0.0777)   
0.0423 
(0.0577)   
0.0013 
(0.0741)   
lag(GDP_per_capita_US) –0.0689 
(0.0389) * 
–0.0656 
(0.0529)   
0.0186  
(0.045)   
0.1259  
(0.088)   
0.0888 
(0.0634)   
0.0759 
(0.0569)   
lag(Trade) 0.0107 
(0.0361)   
0.0218 
(0.0355)   
0.0271 
(0.0438)   
0.1146 
(0.0724)   
0.0605 
(0.0286) ** 
0.09  
(0.0404) ** 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)PCEU –0.1014 
(0.059) * 
–0.1092 
(0.0535) ** 
–0.0988 
(0.0618)   
–0.0613 
(0.0498)   
–0.0566 
(0.0476)   
–0.0158 
(0.0558)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEU –0.2097 
(0.0671) *** 
–0.1913 
(0.047) *** 
–0.1587 
(0.0678) ** 
–0.178 
(0.0496) *** 
–0.1076 
(0.0491) ** 
0.0011 
(0.0621)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)ACEU –0.2085 
(0.0771) *** 
–0.1715 
(0.1347)   
–0.1491 
(0.0673) ** 
–0.1908 
(0.0969) ** 
–0.2121 
(0.0654) *** 
–0.1691 
(0.0834) ** 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)MBEU –0.191 
(0.0711) *** 
–0.1749 
(0.0592) *** 
–0.09  
(0.0591)   
–0.2099 
(0.0824) ** 
–0.0881 
(0.0489) * 
–0.0003 
(0.0704)   
r2/r2adj. 0.7693/0.679 0.7459/0.6578 0.6857/0.6043 0.5479/0.4825 0.7895/0.6963 0.7009/0.6176 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; lag() denotes lagged one period; sample: 1996–2012, 31 
countries, unbalanced panel because of data availability; two-way fixed-effects OLS estimator; panel robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
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Table 15 Two-way within OLS estimates with annual data and EA sample 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(WGI) 0.7747 
(0.0347) *** 
0.6895 
(0.0403) *** 
0.5858 
(0.0718) *** 
0.6716 
(0.0324) *** 
0.6972 
(0.0499) *** 
0.758  
(0.0265) *** 
lag(Status)CCEA 0.0632 
(0.0855)   
0.0191 
(0.0538)   
–0.1047 
(0.0743)   
0.0696 
(0.0712)   
–0.005 
(0.0224)   
–0.0243  
(0.07)   
lag(Status)MBEA 0.0015 
(0.0713)   
–0.1306 
(0.0448) *** 
–0.1213 
(0.0731) * 
–0.0599 
(0.0668)   
–0.0394 
(0.0343)   
0.0191 
(0.0619)   
lag(GDP_per_capita_US) –0.0287 
(0.0489)   
0.0757 
(0.1241)   
0.2107 
(0.0843) ** 
0.0723 
(0.1144)   
0.1723 
(0.0774) ** 
0.0177  
(0.072)   
lag(Trade) 0.0586 
(0.0292) ** 
0.0279 
(0.0788)   
0.2416 
(0.0403) *** 
0.0867 
(0.0827)   
0.0397 
(0.0372)   
0.0566 
(0.0655)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEA –0.0319 
(0.0759)   
0.0479 
(0.0448)   
0.224  
(0.0696) *** 
–0.0346 
(0.0645)   
0.0417 
(0.0225) * 
0.0433 
(0.0582)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)MBEA 0.0014 
(0.0642)   
0.1151 
(0.0449) ** 
0.1714 
(0.0711) ** 
0.0322  
(0.06)   
0.0494 
(0.0305)   
0.0002  
(0.0461)   
r2/r2adj. 0.6308/0.5593 0.6327/0.561 0.6848/0.6071 0.513/0.4549 0.699/0.6197 0.602/0.5338 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; lag() denotes lagged one period; sample: 1996–2012, 28 
countries, unbalanced panel because of data availability; two-way fixed-effects OLS estimator; panel robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
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Table 16 Blundell–Bond system GMM estimates 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(WGI) 0.8467 
(0.0994) *** 
0.7871 
(0.1017) *** 
0.7546 
(0.0635) *** 
0.4909 
(0.1158) *** 
0.8522 
(0.0553) *** 
0.7771 
(0.0693) *** 
lag(StatusPCEU) 0.19  
(0.0727) *** 
–0.0681 
(0.0692)   
0.0063 
(0.0448)   
–0.2821 
(0.2684)   
0.0673 
(0.0397) * 
0.0152 
(0.0634)   
lag(StatusCCEU) 0.1487 
(0.0897) * 
–0.0319 
(0.076)   
0.0687 
(0.0425)   
–0.0606 
(0.1307)   
0.0261 
(0.0393)   
0.1052 
(0.0665)   
lag(StatusCCEA) 0.2164 
(0.1218) * 
–0.1615 
(0.0969) * 
–0.004 
(0.0639)   
–0.1104 
(0.1819)   
0.0091 
(0.0408)   
0.0433 
(0.1362)   
lag(StatusMBEA) 0.324  
(0.1202) *** 
–0.3387 
(0.1324) ** 
–0.1807 
(0.1112)   
–0.2382 
(0.2121)   
–0.155 
(0.0702) ** 
0.0396 
(0.2049)   
lag(WGI*StatusPCEU) –0.3812 
(0.1601) ** 
–0.1621 
(0.0803) ** 
–0.1063 
(0.0692)   
–0.0838 
(0.2259)   
0.0646  
(0.047)   
0.0402 
(0.0944)   
lag(WGI*StatusCCEU) –0.1818 
(0.077) ** 
–0.1548 
(0.063) ** 
–0.1779 
(0.0426) *** 
–0.2096 
(0.1343)   
–0.0449 
(0.0373)   
–0.0973 
(0.0909)   
lag(WGI*StatusCCEA) –0.238 
(0.1395) * 
0.0638 
(0.0642)   
0.0235 
(0.0513)   
–0.0554 
(0.1729)   
0.0332 
(0.0375)   
–0.0043 
(0.1152)   
lag(WGI*StatusMBEA) –0.309 
(0.1376) ** 
0.1419 
(0.0781) * 
0.0308 
(0.0776)   
–0.1165 
(0.1759)   
0.0801 
(0.0465) * 
–0.051 
(0.1566)   
lag(GDP_per_capita_US) 0.1444 
(0.0769) * 
0.1802 
(0.0914) ** 
0.2012  
(0.06) *** 
0.3164 
(0.1014) *** 
0.1084 
(0.0492) ** 
0.1319 
(0.0405) *** 
lag(Trade) 0.0758 
(0.1347)   
0.0623 
(0.1213)   
0.0612  
(0.094)   
0.5914 
(0.1894) *** 
0.0662 
(0.0651)   
0.1317  
(0.126)   
Hansen–Sargan test of 
overid. restrictions 
0.2463 0.6601 0.7754 0.146 0.3602 0.1831 
Arellano–Bond test for 
AR(1) in first differences 
0.0005 0.0004 0 0 0 0 
Arellano–Bond test for 
AR(2) in first differences 
0.0488 0.1123 0.4584 0.3768 0.1083 0.4384 
Notes: System GMM (Blundell, Bond 1998) with Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample correction for standard errors. Lags 2 to 4 are used as instruments. 
The Arellano–Bond test for AR(2) in first differences is rejected for VaA and PSNV in this specification (p-values: 0.0137 for VaA, 0.0780 for PSNV). 
Therefore, we restrict the instruments to lags 3 to 5 for VaA and PSNV. The Arellano–Bond test for AR(3) in first differences is not rejected thereafter 
for VaA and PSNV. Number of instruments: 51 for VaA and PSNV and 52 for the other WGIs. Included exogenous variables (time dummies) are 
counted as instruments. The Hansen–Sargan test for joint validity of the instruments does not reject the null hypothesis for all the WGIs. 
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Table 17 Two-way within OLS estimates with annual data and directions of trade 
 Dependent variable 
Explanatory variables VaA CoC GE PSNV RoL RQ 
lag(WGI) 0.7953 
(0.0206) *** 
0.7707 
(0.0231) *** 
0.7964 
(0.0412) *** 
0.6667  
(0.03) *** 
0.8093 
(0.0361) *** 
0.7763 
(0.0349) *** 
lag(Status)PCEU –0.0103 
(0.0326)   
0.0082 
(0.0221)   
0.0209  
(0.024)   
0.0247 
(0.0323)   
0.0482 
(0.0221) ** 
0.0566 
(0.0198) *** 
lag(Status)CCEU 0.0709 
(0.0522)   
0.0362 
(0.0441)   
0.0925 
(0.0247) *** 
0.0681 
(0.0422)   
0.0473 
(0.0271) * 
0.0398  
(0.042)   
lag(Status)ACEU 0.1911 
(0.0816) ** 
0.027  
(0.0817)   
0.0415 
(0.0493)   
0.0212 
(0.0804)   
0.0862 
(0.0419) ** 
0.1939 
(0.0765) ** 
lag(Status)CCEA 0.0404 
(0.0559)   
0.0033 
(0.0479)   
0.0383 
(0.0394)   
0.0326 
(0.0628)   
0.0609 
(0.0389)   
0.0287 
(0.0624)   
lag(Status)MBEA 0.0249 
(0.0779)   
–0.1421 
(0.0597) ** 
0.0165 
(0.0465)   
–0.0863 
(0.0783)   
0.0317  
(0.035)   
0.055  
(0.0663)   
lag(GDP_per_capita_US) –0.0328 
(0.0321)   
0.0423 
(0.0381)   
0.122  
(0.0359) *** 
0.2239 
(0.0578) *** 
0.0921 
(0.0382) ** 
0.1234 
(0.0421) *** 
lag(Trade.to.EA.GDP) –0.0345 
(0.0192) * 
0.0119 
(0.0116)   
–0.0221 
(0.0165)   
–0.0396 
(0.0275)   
0.0109 
(0.0127)   
0.0097 
(0.0148)   
lag(Trade.to.EU.excl.EA.GDP) 0.0046 
(0.0172)   
0.0158 
(0.0142)   
0.0278 
(0.0195)   
0.0578 
(0.0278) ** 
0.0148 
(0.0165)   
0.0297 
(0.0158) * 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)PCEU 0.0018 
(0.0531)   
–0.0497 
(0.0303)   
–0.0633 
(0.0268) ** 
0.017  
(0.0326)   
–0.0451 
(0.0194) ** 
–0.0578 
(0.0431)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEU –0.0964 
(0.0519) * 
–0.1065 
(0.0251) *** 
–0.1222 
(0.0278) *** 
–0.0722 
(0.0378) * 
–0.0714 
(0.0216) *** 
–0.0443 
(0.0528)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)ACEU –0.2593 
(0.0848) *** 
–0.0914 
(0.118)   
–0.1156 
(0.0415) *** 
–0.1546 
(0.0818) * 
–0.1718 
(0.0443) *** 
–0.2005 
(0.0717) *** 
lag(WGI):lag(Status)CCEA –0.0602 
(0.051)   
–0.0189 
(0.0314)   
–0.0063 
(0.0304)   
–0.0304 
(0.0479)   
–0.0465 
(0.0264) * 
–0.0363 
(0.0577)   
lag(WGI):lag(Status)MBEA –0.0557 
(0.0659)   
0.0429 
(0.0419)   
–0.0369 
(0.0357)   
0.0073 
(0.0522)   
–0.0428 
(0.0279)   
–0.0633 
(0.0507)   
r2/r2adj. 0.6981/0.6294 0.6998/0.6309 0.7235/0.6523 0.571/0.5147 0.7714/0.6954 0.688/0.6202 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively; lag() denotes lagged one period; sample: 1996–2012, 55 countries, 
unbalanced panel because of data availability; no data on direction of trade for Kosovo available; two-way fixed-effects OLS estimator; panel robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
